| Iraq is in the throes of its worst political crisis since the fall of Saddam Hussein with the new democratic system, based on national consensus among its ethnic and sectarian groups, appearing dangerously close to collapsing, say several politicians and analysts. This has brought paralysis to governmental institutions and has left parliament unable to make headway on 18 benchmarks Washington is using to measure progress in Iraq, including legislation on oil revenue sharing and reforming security forces. And the disconnect between Baghdad and Washington over the urgency for solutions is growing. The Iraqi parliament is set for an August vacation as the Bush administration faces pressure to show progress in time for a September report to Congress. At the moment, Iraqi politicians are simply trying to keep the government from disintegrating. |
So few words, so many dubious judgements:
(1) Neither the currently imposed neorégime nor any predecessor has been "based on national consensus." Realists will say all have been based on Republican Party bayonets. Idealists at the CSM might speak de jure (sort of) and claim to think poor M. al-Málikí &c. repose upon the Khalílzád Konstitution. The latter might seem a slight improvement on frank Party invasion-basin' and right of conquest, in that the KK at least aspires towards "national consensus among ethnic and sectarian groups." However to aspire towards and to be based on are not synonymous expressions.
(2) "This has brought paralysis to governmental institutions," we are instructed. Evidently this "this" must be either the political crisis or the dangerous closeness to collapse. Take your pick, it's wrong either way. The primary cause of the patient's paralysis is, once again, the Khalílzád Konstitution. The actual politics of the collaborationist natives is only loosely based on that document, to be sure, or on any other sort of Rulalaw. None of the GZ pols have quite the extremist GOP reverence for original intents, not even for their own from a couple dozen months ago. However the KK may take the lion's share of credit for the paralysis of the formal machinery described in it. That poor kid was paralyzed from birth. Paralyzed from conception, even. And of course paralyzed more or less deliberately by its own Madisons and Hamiltons, who proceeded logically enough on the theory that the great thing is to make sure that the other guys get as few of their original (or subsequent) intents as can be arranged. The KK has certainly achieved what it aimed at, but whether total gridlock was a sensible thing to aim at is another question.[1]
(3) Mr. Dagher fails to see that his "worst political crisis" is coterminous with the formal structure of the neorégime as such. Accordingly, it is no surprise that one cannot make out what the [exp. del.] it consists in, as monitored by Christian Science. His indig quotees can't do much better:
| "Most of the political blocs have failed to operate within the framework of national consensus. They can't even properly formulate their positions and proposals, let alone realize the very serious dangers that surround everyone." |
That gem is from "Fakhri Karim, a close adviser to Messrs. Barzani and Talabani who also publishes the independent Al Mada newspaper." Considering the politics of al-Máda, though, the august Framework of National Consensus is probably equivalent to what poor M. al-Málikí says he thinks Crawford wants. They've all got one of those framework gizmos, naturally, all the GZ pols from all the sects and ethnea of peaceful Freedumbia.
If having a Framework of National Consensus in one's hip pocket had any tendency to produce either a nation or a consensus, the collaborationists might make some headway. Needless to say, it is always only the other guys who insist on being narrow and nonconsensual. Here's one of the other guys:
| "We are firmly convinced after this bitter experience that this government represented by its prime minister is incapable of joining a truly patriotic project," added Mr. Olayan, surrounded by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi and the [Tawáfuq] front's other leaders." |
The "bitter experience" seems to be having ever had anything to do with the UIA's model of a Framework of National Consensus. The quasiparliamentary TwentyPercenters' idea of "a truly patriotic project" does not command majority support inside the TwentyPercenter theocommunity, of course, let alone in the former Iraq more broadly.
Tertiary education gets it more wrong than right closer to home:
| Robert Springborg, director of the Middle East Institute at the University of London, says the heart of the problem was that no one is truly committed to a strong and unified government. "The actors involved have their own agendas, the central government and its resources are a tool for their own aspirations ... none are committed to a government for all Iraqis," he says. |
"Its resources," yes. "The central government," no. The Green Zone Fedguv as constituted under the Khalílzád Konstitution is about on a par with that rattle Tweedledee and Tweedledum went to war over. It's perfectly useless for realizing one's own aspirations. At best it may come in handy at times for interfering with other folks' counteraspirations. Everybody save the Free Kurds is in principle as devoted as devoted can be to "a government for all Iraqis," so devoted that they mean to run the said ideal government themselves and keep all untrue patriots and nonconsensual frameworkers firmly out of it. That is what passes for political normalcy in the Greater Levant, after all.
Those natives whose politics are serious rely primarily on their armed bands to effect their aspirations toward Levantine normalcy, the KK neorégime being perfectly useless and scarcely worth taking over. Its oil and its troops are valuable resources, however. Why, even the militant Republicans have noticed that much!
If Dr. Springborg were to begin with Tweedledee and Tweedledum and the rattle instead of his own refined notions of civilised governance, he might raise more rewarding questions, such as "Who is to be the Great Crow, then?" Poor M. al-Málikí has a theory about that matter, it seems:
| Sami al-Askari, a parliamentarian and close adviser to Maliki, ... accused the Sunni bloc of operating from the get-go more like opposition than a partner. Maliki and his Shiite allies have repeatedly charged that the Sunnis want to bring down the government and reverse the current political equation with the help of regional Sunni Arab powers Egypt and Saudi Arabia. |
The pol will have meant by "reverse the current political equation" that the Sunnintern wants a Sunni Ascendancy back rather than anything immediately to do with the Khalílzád Konstitution, yet if the Great Crow really does fly in from that direction, M. al-‘Askarí's prophetic words will apply well enough to getting rid of the "0+0+0=0" equation that now obtains at Brave New Baghdád.
The whole shebang is most remarkable: how could even Harvard Victory School MBA's have thought to wreak their Party will on Peaceful Freedumbia with a "constitution" that might do in Switzerland but scarcely anyplace else on earth? And some of the tonier commentary is as much fun as the actual wreakin', can't the social scientizers appreciate that since the Swiss actually possess "national consensus among ethnic and sectarian groups," it scarcely matters what their constitution is or whether they have one at all?
==
On the Great Crow front, see this morning's latest Boy-'n'-Party autoleakage to the New York Times , titled "U.S. Officials Voice Frustrations With Saudis’ Role in Iraq" .
| Bush administration officials are voicing increasing anger at what they say has been Saudi Arabia’s counterproductive role in the Iraq war. They say that beyond regarding Mr. Maliki as an Iranian agent, the Saudis have offered financial support to Sunni groups in Iraq. |
Fancy the cowpokers talkin' about anybody else's "counterproductive role"!
____
[1] The Madisons and Hamiltons, along with their superintendant Khalílzád Pasha and his superintendants back at the ranch, were (as I speculate) not aiming directly at total gridlock, though they might as well have been. One might even say they blundered with "national consensus among ethnic and sectarian groups" somewhere vaguely in mind, though that is pushing charity rather hard. Had the blunder been fully cognized and written down, it might read something like "As any fool can plainly see, the greatest political danger to the former Iraq at present is that one sect or ethnos will grab control of the Fedguv and tyrannize over all the rest. Let's make sure that can't happen." And that is exactly what they did.
Certain persons disappointed with the Crawford-blessed Land of Peace and Freedom (disappointed as regards special interests of their own, mostly) profess to think that poor M. al-Málikí is guilty of sectarian tyranny, and so I must be wrong to consider the Khalílzád Konstitution a smashing success, in its own peculiar terms. These persons fail to understand that there is only so much even a genuine constitution can do. Possibly there is a certain amount of sectarian tyranny going on, but none of it is being done with the formal institutions of the Fedguv defined in the KK: M. al-Málikí and the Council of Quasiministers are not officially tyrannizing with the KK executive. The Council of Quasideputies are not tyrannizing through the KK legislative. The KK judiciary has not even been instantiated, so far as I am aware, so how can it be guilty of tyrannizing? It's quite as impossible to tyrannize with the Khalílzád Konstitution as it is to do anything else in particular with it. To be sure, that means that one cannot do "national consensus among ethnic and sectarian groups" with it either.
The militant GOP geniuses themselves appear to have noticed as much recently, although probably not very perspicuously. According to one of this week's Party autoleakages,
| The "near-term" goal is to achieve "localized security" in Baghdad and other areas no later than June 2008. It envisions encouraging political accommodations at the local level, including with former insurgents . . . The "intermediate" goal is to stitch together such local arrangements to establish a broader sense of security on a nationwide basis no later than June 2009. |
The Islamic State of Iraq, and whoever is operating "death squads" out of the secret police quasiministry (if anybody is), and a large number of other armed bands, take essentially Dr. Gen. Petraeus's view of how his own Party's armed band should operate under existin' conditions in Peaceful Freedumbia. If none of the bandits explicitly points out that this involves actin' as if the Khálílzád Konstitution does not exist, doubtless that is because they never thought of it at all in connection with their urgent priorities. The Petraean banditti must do a little lip service, of course, so in my ellipsis above belong the words "while pressing Iraq's leaders to make headway on their program of national reconciliation." (Much good that will do! I believe there is a joke about how do you make a kitten pull a stage coach? Answer "With a whip.")
No comments:
Post a Comment