27 February 2007

Wanted: A Better Class Of Neo-Iraqi Subject

Aha, the masks are off! Amer Mohsen, one of the hired hands over at IraqSlogger, abandons all pretense of impartially summarizing the Greenzonian press and lets loose with a flagrant newsitorial. "A more sinister approach" is only the launching pad:
[T]he Iraqi academic Falih ‘Abd al-Jabbar wrote an article in the government-owned Al-Sabah al-Jadeed warning against the flight of the urban middle class from Iraq. The emigration of the educated and the skilled from the country, ‘Abd al-Jabbar argued, follows a more basic need than economic opportunity or future prospects, instead, middle-class Iraqis are leaving in order to save their lives.

‘Abd al-Jabbar believes that this loss is irreparable, since most of the émigrés will probably never return. The analysis takes a more sinister approach when ‘Abd al-Jabbar establishes a formula of “quality vs. quantity” among Iraqis. The major problematic for ‘Abd al-Jabbar is that “authentically urban” Iraqis are being replaced by “rural” ones who are now flooding the cities. These newcomers, whom the author refers to as “the marginal and migrant groups,” carry in them the seeds of social ills, they are “pre-modern”, their society is “closed,” “hierarchical” and “has a strong tendency towards violence,” according to ‘Abd al-Jabbar.

Aside from the classist generalizations contained in the argument (whether regarding the “modernity” of city-dwellers, or the destructive effects of rural-to-urban migration), the author disregards the fact that most cities in the Global South have witnessed the same dynamics in terms of a sharp rise in the urban population; what distinguishes one experience from another is not the “quality” of urban residents, but the conditions in which they are integrated into society, and the quality of the state that is charged with building their social and educational infrastructure. Most importantly, such an analysis that “ranks” the “quality” of the population allows us to blame the spread of murderous sectarianism and increased violence on the sociological make-up of Iraq, and prevents us from investigating the institutions of political patronage that were built over the last years, fixing the livelihood and political identity of Iraqis –- almost exclusively -- around their sectarian belongings.


Underneath the mask we don't find quite what we should have expected. M. Mohsen sounds like he ought to be tenured in Venezuela or Cuba. "Classist," for Pete's sake! And "Global South!" There can't be many neo-Iraqi subjects who think in those categories, no matter how Bedouin or Westoxicated they may be.

But perhaps that offstage-left Soc. Sci. claptrap is only M. Mohsen individually? His final sentence is most interesting of all, since it may express the overall agenda of Slogger City. It would appear (to them) that somebody has been deliberately setting up patronage institutions based on "sectarianism" ever since the militant Republicans first marched in. Who could be doing this odious deed? Hardly the GOP geniuses themselves, who have yet to exhibit any deliberation worth mention in their invasion and occupation policies.

In context, it looks as if customers are being solicited to blame poor M. al-Málikí and the U.I.A. caucus: if the current neo-regime owns the printing press, doesn't it probably own M. ‘Abd al-Jabbár's opinions as well? One gets the impression that the New Baghdad papers are at least as strict as the Washington Times or the op-ed page of the Wall Street Jingo about not disseminating any material they do not more or least agree with, and doubtless an organ literally belonging to the locally predominant faction would be even stricter.

But that hypothesis does not altogether make sense. Perhaps the pols of Da‘wa and SCIRI and the Virtue Party and the Sadr Tendency could somehow impose "sectarian identity" schemes of patronage upon Twelvers in general -- though even that much is doubtful -- but how could they impose them upon everybody? Did the Shi‘a start this racket rolling, and then the Kurdish and Arab Sunni and rootless cosmopolitan communities saw how well it worked for them and hastened to do likewise for themselves?

I do not think Slogger City wants us to take that view, because it comes close, after all, to suggesting that these sinister arrangements are "natural" in neo-Iraq, just the sort of thing one might have expected to happen once the Ba‘thís became unable to prevent them from happening. Mr. Bush's speechwriters were mistaken once again: GOP brand "Freedom" does not, in fact, "Mean Peace" -- somehow it turns out to mean rather "institutions of political patronage fixing the livelihood and political identity of Iraqis around their sectarian belongings."

That view, in turn, is within hailing distance of the sort of verbal shrug that one hears from disgruntled invasionites, "What can we do?, they've been killing one another for a thousand years over there" &c. &c. (Not a desirable neighborhood.)

In any case, M. Mohsen, and presumably his employers, inform us that these arrangements were "built," a word that, in English, strongly suggests that there must have been ascertainable builders. Furthermore, this is the Middle East we speak of, where there are multiple conspiracy theories about any human event of significance, and hardly anybody ever claims that such-and-such happened "naturally" or "freely." There is always somebody's thumb on the scale, even if sometimes the Levantines and Byzantines cannot make out exactly whose thumb it is.

For all his fierce rebuttal, M. Mohsen does not think that Dr. ‘Abd al-Jabbár's deplorable classist opinions created these institutions of sectarian identity. He is mainly worried that Jabbarism might distract the comrades from the real struggle, as Slogger City conceives it. At the same time, if sociological analysis be supposed an unimportant distraction from political accountability and political action, he who so supposes can be no great friend of "naturally" and "freely" -- although perhaps Dr. ‘Abd al-Jabbár is not very friendly either. M. Mohsen does not quote enough of his culprit to indicate where the latter supposes that "authentically urban" neo-Iraqi subjects came from in the first place. It does, however, look as if whatever factory produced them cannot be expected to supply unlimited quantitites of the product on demand.

The fierceness is remarkable, not merely as grossly inappropriate to summarization of other people's newspaper articles, but as addressed to a mere distraction rather than the actual enemy. I suspect M. Mohsen is worried that Jabbarism might move from sociology to politics, as it were, and start attempting to make sure that real control of public affairs is reserved to authentic urbanites and denied to the riff-raff. Again, there is no way to judge from the available evidence whether Dr. ‘Abd al-Jabbár plots anything of the sort, yet perhaps the bare possibility that he could do so seems enough to warrant a sort of preëmptive retaliation from the Sloggerites.

The analogy with Mr. Blair of Great Britain on the subject of Saddám Husayn could be pressed a bit farther still: is not Jabbarism potentially a sort of WMD, a weapon for destroying mass participation in politics? Even if all the parts have not yet been assembled nor the elitist terror device actually deployed, still, better safe than sorry!

I'm not altogether joking. The danger that the extremist GOP's neo-Iraq will stop even pretending to be "democratic" and become much like the other barracks-based republics of the Levant is not a private fantasy of my own. Why, just yesterday at Slogger City we read about disband the elected parliament and set up an emergency military administration if there is no success in forming an opposition coalition. M. Mohsen's stale scientific socialism is not a matter I can take altogether seriously, but nevertheless the colony he lives in really does rather resemble Latin America and suffers from certain caudillo and oligarquía dangers and problems that are real enough. His diagnosis is not necessarily all wrong because some of his treatment theories savor of snake oil.

From well outside the cock pit, though, I'd say that M. Mohsen is quite as "classist" as Dr. ‘Abd al-Jabbár is, and to some extent classist in the same sense. He's different insofar as he clearly wants to change the world, whereas the accused may desire no more than to interpret it. What they agree on, though, is that they both wish "classism" was a more salient category than "sectarianism" so badly that they have begun to take their desires for observations of fact. As it seems to me. Compared to that, it seems much less important that in some alternate universe where Green Zone politics is in fact based on economics rather than "sectarian" "identity," Dr. ‘Abd al-Jabbár would probably side with the bosses, and M. Mohsen certainly with the rest of us. Less important still is that they both think a good deal better of social scientizing than I do.

(By the way, it seems a logical enough remnant of the Cold War that Dr. ‘Abd al-Jabbár should social-scientize after the fashion of American neo-orientalism or "area studies," and M. Mohsen vaguely in a Marxist way. To notice this difference, however, is merely historical, and thus so entirely unimportant that it might as well be bunk.)

26 February 2007

M. al-Shahristání on American Unseriousness

Another Shi'a critic of security plan [besides the Rev. al-Sadr, vide infra] was Husain al-Shahrastani, the leader of an “independent” bloc within the Shi'a alliance. Pan-Arab al-Hayat quoted the Shi'a politician as saying that the American forces are not serious about training and equipping the Iraqi Army. Al-Shahrastani also criticized the conduct of government agencies, corruption and the infiltration of militias into the security organizations. Al-Shahrastani, who used to work in the Iraqi nuclear program, was imprisoned by Saddam and spent several years in exile. His name was touted for the prime minister’s position at [one] point, and he has a certain political credit among Iraqis due to his independence from major sectarian blocs and his incorruptibility.

Al-Sharastani also criticized the emergence of the secret police in the new Iraqi state, saying to his audience that "intelligence services are busy spying on people like you, instead of doing their duties protecting Iraq and its security.”

(read it all)




That's from somebody called "Amer Mohsen" who purports to summarize the neo-Iraqi daily press for the "Iraqslogger" crew It is clear enough that this "independent" M. al-Shahristání counts as a good guy for them, but who are they, and which ax is it that they grind over in Slogger City? Mr. Badger disposed of them summarily yesterday:

(5) The "Indomitable American perseverance" story (IraqSlogger)
(6) The "No real American defeat, but a civil war" story (James D. Fearon, Foreign Affairs magazine)

. . . . Finally, there are the IraqSlogger and the PoliticalScience narratives. If Cobban and Cole tout some kind of ultimate victory for the edification of the left or whoever, these, by contrast, represent ideology for the rest of America. Fearon's story, which was told in another version in his congressional testimony a few months ago, and is now refurbished in the white-shoe Foreign Affairs magazine, is that the Iraq conflict must be understood not as a resistance to foreign occupation, but rather as a civil war, and this means that the American military will have a positive (although diminished) role to play in trying to mitigate the damage and help bring about the best possible outcome in the circumstances. IraqSlogger is the retail version of that, with its denigration of Iraqi participants in the conflict, and its highlighting of American exploits.


(It seems easier to let white-shoed Dr. Fearon hitch a ride than try to edit him out and leave everybody wondering what Slogger City is a "retail version" of. Perhaps we may get around to him later on.)

As often, Mr. Badger's judgment seems a bit off the mark. Anybody else who started with a "narrative" about indomitable Republican Party perseverance in Peaceful Freedumbia and then wanted to look for a specific donkey on which to pin that tale would be likely to start a bit closer to home, say at the twistitorial offices of The Weekly Standard, or indeed, down in the cyclone cellar at Rancho Crawford itself. However, the Slogger City militia do seem to want the Occupyin' Power to hang around forever, since their free web materials are basically a come-on to get corporate marks to pay for secret security advice. Ideally, I suppose, the bushogenic quagmire would go on forever and never get too much better or too much worse. In order to make that happen, the sloggers must preach "indomitable persistence" to the Boy-'n'-Party folks, but this is a rather insincere sort of evangelism, when the dwindlin' GOP customer base remain all agog to come up with "victory," but the merchandisers are not interested in providing that product at all. That is rather too specialized a "narrative" to be included in a list of merely six, I should think.

At the moment, though, we must inquire how one would warp the news to advance that agenda. The answer seems plain enough: to keep the troubles goin' for ever, always side with whoever seems to be losin' at the moment, but be prepared to reverse course instantly as soon as yesterday's pets stop losin' and start winnin'. Accordingly, I presume that M. al-Shahristání must be accounted a loser at the moment by Slogger City and M. Mohsen, and that opinion is easy enough to maintain. "Independence" has not worked out very well in Green Zone collaborationist politics, after all. Where are the rootless cosmopolitans of yesteryear, the "secularists," the "technocrats," M. le Docteur Ahmed Tchélabí and ‘Iyád ‘Alláwí, M.D.? They are still hanging around the corridors of carnage, to be sure, but scarcely in power. M. al-Shahristání is almost a caricature of this westoxicated band of losers, possessin' of course a pricey foreign Ph.D. and an admirable C.V., a nominal Twelver who both worked for the Ba‘thís and was persecuted by them. M. Tchélabí perhaps has a slight edge now that he has both worked with the cowpokers and been persecuted by 'em, but on the other hand the Hero of Error is clearly a con-man and a wannabe pol, whereas Dr. S. is "independent" even of these minor weaknesses. (Perhaps he should run for Pope or something?)

All of which is merely the flip side of that "sectarian violence" that the militant GOP has recently decided requires to be Surged against.

However collaborationist politicking has become quite complicated of late, and M. Mohsen may well be at loss occasionally to decide who is a loser requirin' temporary support. In practice, Slogger City has very little use for poor M. al-Málikí and the mainstream U.I.A.caucus, and M. Amer Mohsen positively allows himself to poke fun at Al-Máda, the pro-neorégime fishwrap that he usually singles out. I infer that the sloggers are indeed workin' by the principle suggested, but that they are not doin' so very cleverly, and in particular that they have a tendency to be deceived by superficial appearances.

Turning to Dr. al-Shahristání, we wonder, of course, exactly what audience he was addressing when he said the secret state police should not be spying on people like them. In an "ideal" Levantine polity, doubtless all subjects would be so assured, and all subjects impartially spied upon. But is Dr. S. really that nonsectarian? It seems unlikely. Anyhow, M. Mohsen really ought to have told us.

The main tidbit, though, is "that the American forces are not serious about training and equipping the Iraqi Army." One does not quite know what to make of that without more context. Was he complaining that the Crawfordites have been favorin' the Quasiministry of Interior whereas it is towards the Quasiministry of Defence that they ought to be surgin' their attentions? That is to say, are the two points M. Mohsen selects for his customers' attention connected? And what about poor M. al-Málikí? Does Dr. S. sympathize with his PM and his caucus and sincerely wish they had more tanks and bombers and competent violence pros to deploy "independently" of the Occupyin' Power, or are these goodies, if ever made avaialble, to go into other hands that may even be planning to dispense with the present neorégime altogether and install something ganz anders instead? The sort of scenario I allude to typically speaks of setting up the former ‘Alláwí as "strongman," but that plan strikes me as ridiculous. His political incompetence has been demonstrated, and he doesn't even pretend to any military competence of the sort that the other barracks-based republics of the Levant repose upon. Dr. S. is certainly an intelligent man, perfectly capable of scheming once again to build up the Quasiministry of Defence to a point where some patriot colonel or general could plausibly emerge from it to become the true "independent" and "nonsectarian" George Washington of Peaceful Freedumbia at long last.

The underlying correlation of forces is a bit like the Spain of Century XIX, where a peculiar sort of "military liberalism" emerged logically enough. Civilian liberales were seriously outnumbered by sectarian --nay, "Apostolic," even! -- sérviles, perhaps outnumbered quite as badly as Dr. Shahristání's rootless cosmopolitan theo-community is at the moment. Nobody illuminado and westoxicated is against popular self-rule, of course, perish the thought!, but let's face it, señores, we are only ten or twelve percent of the Homeland, and if the bayonet people don't help put us in power, we shall never be in power at all, which in turn means that we shall never be able to help the benighted 88% change their ways for something better. (And so forth and so on. Plus toss in "Of course, it's only temporary.")

Speaking of sérviles, the Rev. Señorito al-Sadr mentions Dr. S.'s point briefly in his recent message to the troops, although Slogger City omits the particular detail in their summary and we must go to Ann Arbor for it:

A representative of Muqtada al-Sadr read a statement by him, according to BBC Arabic, that said: "I say to the Iraqi security forces, and in particular the army and the police: You can protect Iraq and its people by virtue of your faith and sacrifices, your patience and solidarity and sincerity toward the people. But you cannot do it via HELP FROM THE AIRPLANES AND TANKS OF THE OCCUPIER." He added, "I am confident, like all persecuted Iraqis, that no security plan can succeed or produce any good by depending on the Occupation." Al-Wasat gives a further passage: "Stay away from them and God will keep you away from mischief and harm . . . Make your plan Iraqi and independent, not sectarian or dictatorial, so that you will be victorious. Stay away from oppression and harming others, so that others will have no case against you. Let your reputation be that of being Iraqi . . ."

Some are misinterpreting these remarks to say that Muqtada has turned against the security plan. In fact, he is strongly supporting it, he just wants it to be a national plan and a national victory, and wants Iraqi troops to be able to do without American air and other support.

The BBC story says that many Iraqi Shiites in Baghdad would have felt safer in their neighborhoods if they were still being patrolled by the Mahdi Army. But the al-Maliki government, which they see as subservient to the Americans, has pressured Muqtada to get the Mahdi Army off the streets. But in its absence there have been massive bombings of Shiite markets, which the Baghdad Shiites are therefore blaming on the US.



Don Juan's imperious exegesis and "Kindly allow me to know best!" are as unfortunate as anything of Mr. Badger's, and go a long way to explain the latter's bad attitude about the former. Be that as it may, however, it certainly looks as if Dr. Shahristání and the Rev. al-Sadr would offer poor M. al-Málikí diametrically opposed advice about accepting advanced weapons and well-trained auxiliaries from the militant GOP. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes! exclaims Master Muqtadá, although naturally not in Latin. It may be obscure what Dr. Shahristání hopes or plots for, but what the Rev. is afraid of could not be plainer, "How if poor M. al-Málikí is compelled by the Occupyin' Power to use all that stuff against ME? Better he should not have it at all!" The only obscurity is how M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres will take such advice as that. He has shown definite signs of wanting to have more toy soldiers to play with, and even asking the Crawfordites for more than they were prepared to grant, but on the other hand, his quasiparliamentary dependency on the Sadr Tendency is notorious.

Collaborationist politics has become complicated indeed, and it does not make things easier that Sadr Tertius refuses to admit that he collaborates in the first place. If the rest of the U.I.A. caucus thought like American pols, which I suspect they do not, they would find Master Muqtadá's attitude extremely irritating, because when the Kiddie Krusaders finally go home, he is bound to say "I never yielded an inch to the Crawford oppressor, whereas . . . ." That is not quite true, and it's a good deal less than fair to the others, because if they had not dirtied their hands, there would have been no Twelver Ascendancy at all to wrangle over. Yet the rest of them will have to go to the electorate saying things like "Look, if we had not what-you-call 'collaborated,' everything would have been far worse. Maybe we would never have got rid of them." The claim of the Sadriyya to have kept their hands spotlessly clean is not exactly a fact, but it's nevertheless likely to run far ahead of apologetic counterfactuals.

Reverting to Virgil, one may wonder how bees feel when they hear sic vos, non vobis, mellificatis apes quoted? More than a bit miffed, I suspect.

==

Prof. Cole used to twit the Boy-and-Party extremists because they refused to equip Marvin the ARVN with fancy weapons and high-tech whizbangs, especially tanks, more or less on Muqtadá's lines: the more they give, the more will probably fall into the wrong hands. Does he think so still?