The front runner in the "Right at the End of the Tunnel Sweepstakes" is Ambassador Peter Galbraith. Strict critics may think he's a cheater, though, because he wants to impose very little, and he mostly wants to impose it upon Crawfordites instead of their semiconquered native subjects. Success, from the Galbrathian standpoint , is when he gets the man Lugar of Indiana to say things like
| Few Iraqis have demonstrated that they want to be Iraqis ... In this context, the possibility that the United States can set meaningful benchmarks that would provide an indication of impending success or failure is remote. Perhaps some benchmarks or agreements will be initially achieved, but most can be undermined or reversed by a contrary edict of the Iraqi government, a decision by a faction to ignore agreements, or the next terrorist attack or wave of sectarian killings. American manpower cannot keep the lid on indefinitely. The anticipation that our training operations could produce an effective Iraqi army loyal to a cohesive central government is still just a hopeful plan for the future. |
After applauding these sentiments of the repentant aggression fan, Galbraith goes on reword them his own way:
| We need to recognize, as Lugar implicitly does, that Iraq no longer exists as a unified country. In the parts where we can accomplish nothing, we should withdraw. But there are still three missions that may be achievable -- disrupting al-Qaida, preserving Kurdistan's democracy and limiting Iran's increasing domination. These can all be served by a modest U.S. presence in Kurdistan. We need an Iraq policy with sufficient nuance to protect American interests. Unfortunately, we probably won't get it. |
None of this morning's specimens aspire to impose anything that much appeals to me, so if Ambassador Galbraith thinks he is failing rather than triumphing, perhaps that's OK too.
His "sufficient nuance" is a curious business. I should have thought the main trouble with almost all Homeland impositionists (foreigners and indigs are different) is that they refuse ever to be crude enough about "to protect American interests." It's like pulling teeth to get any Yank impositionist to say exactly what she conceives those interests to be. The result of this shyness is unfortunate in the present state of the quagmire, where everybody outside the fever swamps of Rio Limbaugh agrees that occupation policy for the former Iraq must be made at least somewhat less ambitious and aggressive. Having no defined war aims means that there are no minimum war aims, and no way to talk about defining a set of the latter that might be effectively implemented.
Ambassador Galbraith of course wants to sneak in the absolute independence of the Free Kurds as a war aim and a (nuanced, indeed!) national interest of his Uncle Sam. He is so isolated in taking this position that not much harm can come of him except by way of confusion over "limiting Iran's increasing domination," language which appeals to what's left of the gung-ho Kiddie Krusaders, who are certainly not thinkin' of Free Kurdistan when they bark and bellow. [1] However the Free Kurds are free enough to be getting on with already, and as for the Big Party's other spear-won provinces in the neighborhood,
| [T]here will be no Saigon moment in Iraq. Iraq's Shiite-led government is in no danger of losing the civil war to al-Qaida, or a more inclusive Sunni front. Iraq's Shiites are three times as numerous as Iraq's Sunni Arabs; they dominate Iraq's military and police and have a powerful ally in neighboring Iran. The Arab states that might support the Sunnis are small, far away (vast deserts separate the inhabited parts of Jordan and Saudi Arabia from the main Iraqi population centers), and can only provide money, something the insurgency has in great amounts already. Iraq after an American defeat will look very much like Iraq today -- a land divided along ethnic lines into Arab and Kurdish states with a civil war being fought within its Arab part. |
Not absolutely certain, that, but it is the most sensible way to bet all the same. The only trouble with Peter Galbraith saying so too is that he is so relentlessly Kurdocentric that one has trouble believing he much cares what happens to any of the rest of Crawford's neoliberateds. Would he object, if contrary to likely expectation, the Sunni Ascendancy racket was somehow reëstablished? It does not seem too likely. [2]
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Exhibit B, "Professor Righteous Virtue," let us call it, could not agree less with Ambassador Galbraith and the man Lugar. RV's own kind of interpretation is thus described:
| This kind of interpretation focuses on widespread ideological resistance to federalism among Iraqis, as a far more profound force than calculations about oil and money. |
That major triumph of invisibilia over mere visibilia is not quite all the way around the bend. Dr. Virtue does not actually claim that his "widespread ideological resistance to federalism" trumps the religionism of our neo-Iraqi subjects as well as their devotion to Lord Mammon. Unfortunately, he pretty clearly supposes that it does. Gazing downwards from so sublime a superidealistic and metafactual plane, naturally he takes a dim view of the Supreme Council with their fiendish plans for disunity. He thinks he's winning, impositionwise, mainly because he thinks that SIIC/SCIRI is losing. Yesterday's bulletin from Outer Virtuestan was titled The Supreme Council Marks Fourth Anniversary of Baqir al-Hakim’s Assassination: No Mention of Federalism . No news is good news, needless to remark. Except that maybe it isn't:
| There are two possible explanations as to why the Supreme Council apparently has toned down its federalism rhetoric in 2007. One recurrent argument is that they do so for purely utilitarian reasons: they recognise that many Arab states are highly critical of the concept of a single Shiite region (and therefore the Supreme Council do not wish to isolate themselves), or they may be trying to pose as “moderates” for a US audience. This is way of reasoning which is broadly similar to “rational” explanations offered for the federal attitudes of other players in Iraqi politics as well: the Sadrists are “against” a Shiite federal entity because their core electorate supposedly is in Baghdad and therefore outside the projected region; similarly the Sunnis are “against” any federalism because “their” federal region would have no oil. |
That's all only Explanation I, notice: either the fiends are pandering to (Ia), the Sunnintern, or (Ib) they are pandering to the Crawfordites. No matter which, they remain fiends and Dr. Virtue has no use for them at all, no more than he has for "rationality" or "moderation." Explanation II is much cheerier, however:
| An alternative explanation is that the Supreme Council is beginning to understand the limits to the popular appeal of the idea of a single Shiite entity. This kind of interpretation focuses on widespread ideological resistance to federalism among Iraqis, as a far more profound force than calculations about oil and money. Interestingly, for the first time, there is now greater harmony between the message of the Supreme Council and the tone of the leading ulama of Najaf, with focus on “unity” and even condemnation of armed groups outside the governmental system. Still, the link to the grand ayatollahs remains tentative, Hakim on this occasion “renewing his praise for the religious leadership and, in their vanguard, Imam Sistani”. If the Supreme Council were to aspire to a role as a true force of reconciliation in Iraq, it would have to go even further: it would need to openly declare a break with its long-time sponsor, the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, and it would have to translate its new-found, apparently more flexible position on federalism into formal concessions in the ongoing constitutional revision process. That could bring Sunnis and many non-sectarian Shiites fully back into the political process in Iraq, and only then would the party deserve the label “moderate” which is so often designated to it by US commentators. |
Like Ambassador Galbraith, Dr. Virtue insists on dragging in the evil Qommies in a manner that has itself a certain air of pandering about it, appealing to other people's silly notions that one does not even begin to share. He doesn't give a discernible hoot about the Free Kurds, his ferocious ideology of antifederalism has nothing to do with them. In principle RV and PG could pander together to the real core anti-Safavids, whose own fear and loathing of Iran has no more to do with its alleged support of the Supreme Council than with its Kurdish minority problems. However this theoretically viable alliance is unlikely to be consummated, for Galbraith is, loosely speaking, a partitionite, and therefore a monster himself in the eyes of Virtue.
Unlike the isolated ambassador, Dr. Righteous Virtue agrees to a large extent with Ms. Conventional Wisdom (and with Rancho Crawford and with Ann Arbor and with the ISG/CFR gentry) about the basic outlines of a revised occupation policy, only he is rather more specific about details, as befits a tertiary educationalist: "formal concessions in the ongoing constitutional revision" are now to "bring Sunnis and many non-sectarian Shiites fully back into the political process in Iraq" and then everything will be OK. This ploy, too, is perhaps just a tad disingenuous on RV's part, since neither the Crawfordites, who can actually do the imposin', nor the Arab Sunni TwentyPercenters, for whom the imposition of Affirmative Action™ is solicited, are on the exact Virtue wavelength. The former will settle for anythin' at all they can call "success and victory" without actually bein' laughed at. The latter will settle for nothing short of restoration of the Sunni Ascendancy.
If one insists on a very strict match, Dr. Virtue is even more isolated than Ambassador Galbraith, who has all those Free Kurds solidly behind him. RV is the leader of a sort of party of zero, since as a non-Iraqi he can't really be a member of his own factionette. If by some fluke, however, Conventional Wisdom et al. turns out to be right and the happy Land of Peace and Freedom can really be stabilized on a five-votes-per-Sunni basis, obviously somebody will have had to twist the arm of the Supreme Council mercilessly, and then Dr. Virtue can point us all back to yesterday's article and claim to have told us so. (If you decide to bet on that, ask your bookmaker for very long odds.)
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The third party that seems suddenly to think it's winning is a far more serious contender, namely the Sunnintern, or at least the Times of Bazzázístán. Over at "Iraq Today," successor to "Today in Iraq," there is a curious invasion-language gloating about how poor M. al-Málikí is doomed because the extremist GOP palefaces are already on their way out the door
| Iraqi politicians naively thought that marching on the same path of lies would hold the U.S. administration a hostage to their shortsightedness. Instead of using their own capabilities to run the country, they thought no matter what happens the world’s most powerful country would remain on their side and believe their lies. Iraqi politicians believed they could extort the U.S. The extortion was mutual, they thought, because the U.S. would never give up Iraq. Little did they know that the best strategies are those which adapt to the situation and that time would come when Iraq would turn into such a liability and burden that the U.S. itself would like to get rid of. |
And just for fun, let's toss in Kristol Minor, equally without comment:
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[1] In a very mild way, perhaps vindicating the liberty of the Free Kurds might make Uncle Sam look a little less bad to Princess Posterity and her historians, even despite militant GOP extremism. One would have had to swallow a massive dose of the "soft power" snake oil, however, to attach much importance to that. Hopefully Mr. G. does not seriously mean to suggest a geopolitical joke about Free Kurdistan being an important bastion in the world-historic struggle against the evil Qommies. But probably he only inflicts that particular "nuance" on us in order to try to embed his own pet earmark into the Salvation of Mesopotamia Bill of 200X.
[2] If having assured the independence of Free Kurdistan and its safety from ever being mucked about with from Baghdad ever again would look good in the textbooks of 2157, why should not having smashed the Sunni Ascendancy insisted upon by Turks and Brits and Mecca monarchists and barracks-based republicans all alike -- and to that extent installing a bare minimum of democracy -- look rather good as well? To be sure, it is not certain that Ambassador Galbraith worries about the judgments of Princess Posterity at all, and, indeed, perhaps it is foolish for anybody to worry.
I'd guess, though, that PG is still under the spell of St. Woodrow Wilson to the extent that the formula of "national self-determination" has implications -- democratic implications -- about what happens inside the borders as well as where the borders are to be drawn. But God knows best.
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