| [D]ifferences came out into the open in the form of warring public statements between the Islamic State of Iraq (a coalition including Al-Qaeda) and the Islamic Army in Iraq, exposing previously unacknowledged animosity. As the two groups went at each other in the media, other Sunni groups began a complicated process of splintering and reformation. The 1920 Revolution Brigades split into two military factions, Fatah and Jihad, with Fatah later reclaiming the 1920 Revolution Brigades name. Hamas-Iraq, which emerged as the first armed movement to build political and media institutions parallel to its military activities, joined forces with the Iraqi Resistance Islamic Front. In early May 2007, the Jihad and Reform Front was formed, incorporating the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Mujahideen Army, and the Sharia Committee of Ansar al-Sunna (which split from its mother organization, Ansar al-Sunna), with the Fatiheen Army joining later. Then in early September seven factions, including the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Al-Rashideen Army, joined forces to establish the Jihad and Change Front. This period of upheaval has left four main blocs in the Iraqi Sunni resistance: first, Jihadist Salafism, which is an extension of Al-Qaeda. This bloc consists primarily of the Islamic State of Iraq and is close to Ansar al-Sunna as well. Second, nationalist Salafism, which observers believe toes the Saudi Salafist line and receives material and moral support from abroad. The groups in the Jihad and Reform Front belong to this bloc. Third, the Muslim Brotherhood trend, mainly Hamas-Iraq and the Resistance Islamic Front. Observers believe it is associated with the Islamic Party, which participates in politics within the Iraqi Accord parliamentary bloc. And fourth, the nationalist Islamist trend, including the Jihad and Change Front groups (such as the 1920 Revolution Brigades and Al-Rashideen Army). This bloc is ideologically close to the Brotherhood trend and is considered an extension of the Association of Muslim Scholars, the leading group of Iraqi Sunni clerics. |
One, two, seven, four whole blocs of 'em, plus AMS![3] Total Unity breeds like rabbits, and even reminds one of Mr. Malthus about the superior powers of multiplication over addition. And the enumeration is obviously incomplete, since in the window it said "armed Sunni factions in Iraq since the beginning of the occupation," but when we get inside the shop, there is not much sign of anybody but faith-crazies: so toss in maybe three flavours and colours of strict Ba‘thiyya plus a few odd neuters and other eccentrics.
Unsurprisingly, given the credentials in note [1], our analyst is not altogether pleased with the situation and goes on to ask What Went Wrong? and maybe even Who's To Blame?:
| [I]t is important to understand why Sunni groups are experiencing such turmoil. Two factors - US discussion of withdrawal from Iraq and genuine ideological and political differences among Sunnis - can explain what is taking place. |
That seems safe enough and even almost tautological, although it is a small puzzle why he should puts the cart behind the horse like that. It seems very unlikely that all the Total Unitizers of the Former Iraq waited until they were deluded into supposing success and victory over the militant GOP was just around the corner before making up their very own factious banner and flying it high. We did after all read "kept quiet" in the shop window, an expression that seems to indicated that something for the devotees to hush up already existed. (God knows best.)
When he expands on cart and horse, however, Dr. Abú Rummán turns out to mean something a bit different than it appeared, especially about the cart: the hypothesized irresponsible withdrawal of Republican Party forces is only the occasion, not the essence, of his cart, which consists rather in even more diversities of tawhídiyya, this time amongst various external Sunninterní patrons of the TwentyPercenters:
| [T]he Islamic State of Iraq (Al-Qaeda and its allies) has not only tried to spread its influence among the other factions, it has also demanded that many faction members pledge allegiance to its emir, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. At the same time, Arab countries (particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia) have begun to worry about who will fill the power vacuum after the US withdraws. Such countries are concerned about preventing the dual threat of increasing Iranian influence and the rising power of Al-Qaeda in western Iraq, the latter of which constitutes a clear and direct threat to their security. |
Again the enumeration is incomplete, Khurasán and al-Riyád and ‘Ammán are perhaps the outside agitators best able to stir the pot, but there are lots of other wannabes, notably including Damascus and the Anglo-Arabian Press Trust. As a Háshimí subject, this analyst is, I suppose, inspired by either loyalty or prudence to play down the Street Arab brand of Sunnintern kibitzing in the former Iraq. [4]
When it comes to the horse behind the cart, Dr. Abú Rummán at least manages to avoid the more absurd brands of starry-eyed idealization:
| The outcome depends on many variables, but especially the relationship between Al-Qaeda and other factions in the Sunni fold, as well as the relative military strength of various groups.[5] |
His tail has the right sort of scorpion sting in it, but not the exact individual scorpion, unless in the improbable event that the relative military strength of various groups that are not TwentyPercenters or Sunninternís at all is far less than appears.
Not to count your chickens before they hatch, O Total Unitizers!
____
[1]
| Muhammad Abu Rumman is a Jordanian scholar and writer. This commentary, translated from the Arabic by Paul Wulfsberg, is reprinted with permission from the Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 5, issue 7 (September 2007) www.CarnegieEndowment.org/ArabReform ... |
[2] That would be qawmí rather than wataní, I presume, although neither epithet fits the Great Cardboard Kingdom exactly.
[3] Let's try to work it out exactly, Mr. Bones: Bloc One must have at least three total unities to it, Bloc Two seven, Bloc Three comprehends three (or perhaps four) distinct total unities. Bloc Four, however, seems to involve some cheating on Dr. A.R.'s part, for he plainly proposes to recount some or all of the seven total unities of Bloc Two. It's not clear that there is anything really distinctive there, total-unity-wise, apart from M. al-Dárí & Cie. But in any case, here are at least fourteen smithereens of the Tawhíd al-Kámil present, twelve military and two collaborationist-political. Not at all a bad show by Malthus standards if dated from early 1 January 2007.
[4] Omitting to mention the Street Arabs proper could even be an Arab Palace manipulation to tacitly confound them with M. Bin Ládin and Dr. Zawáhirí out in Khurasán. One could arrive at the same result by working backwards from the remedy that seems to be proposed: an anti-Safavid Axis would appeal to The Base even though there is no proper Arab Palace out in Khurasán, whereas it would not appeal to the Republican Palace people of Syria. The AAPT or coffee-house intellectual sort of Street Arabs would likely disagree about that project, there being a sort of "left" to disapprove and a "right" that cares not at all for the evil Qommies. Still, de minimis non curat rex, the AAPT is perhaps really too impotent to signify.
[5] Again, a loyal/prudent dynastic analysis is readily at hand, though not mandatory: certainly all the cardboard kings and princes do not fancy any such "Islamic State of Iraq" product as that label is currently pasted on any more than a Safavid take-over. BGKB.
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