| The last thing the Middle East's main players want is US troops to leave Iraq Across the region, ordinary people want the Americans out. But from Israel to al-Qaida, political groups and states have other ideas |
Since The Guardian was kind enough to supply the boardroom here at Walter Mitty Ltd. with our belovèd executive summary instead of a mere headline, let us linger a bit, sir, and not rush on impetuously like gland-crazed invasionites. The scribbler is one Husain Agha, "a senior associate member of St Antony's College, Oxford," -- and one can even linger over as little as that, if only to wonder when the Oxbridge branch of world tertiary educationalism starting having "members" instead of fellows and undergraduates and lecturers and vice-chancellors and servants &c. Perhaps the motive for the change was gender neutrality? That might have been a success, but If it had anything to do with democratisation, the word shufflers seem to have let the class dog return to its vomit with "senior associate." How far up the totem pole is M. Husain Agha, I wonder?
Not that Brit paedagogic fuss and feathers makes any difference, of course, when it comes to the evaluation of M. Agha's brand of Secret Levantine Truth. Father Zeus forbid that we should ever reject a potentially precious fluid merely because of its container! When we do not recall ever hearing of the container before, that is. When we do recall and the truth container is labeled "Amir Taheri," say, or "David Horowitz," or "Noam Chomsky," or "Grand Ayatollah Michael bin Ledeen," we undoubtedly do rather tend to look at our watch and mutter "Farce is long, but life is short" and then pass by on the other side. 'Tis true, Mr. Bones, I fear, that we are not e-Quakers or e-Gandhians with scruples that prevent reliance on any killfiles whatsoever.
Moving on to linger over the executive summary rather than the by-line, I suppose M. Agha expects that we will be surprised to hear him say such a thing. However, we are not. Au contraire, our first thought is why he should make his SLT thesis so narrow, restricting it with "main players" and "across the region." Why did he not care to live dangerously and go for broke? Why not hypothesize that ALL the OnePercenters of the world, plus such of the 99% as they are able to bigmanage effectively, favour GOP nonwithdrawal from Peaceful Freedumbia?
The obvious flip side would, however, be indefensible: a great many of the 99%, "ordinary people," do not care one way or the other. Why, some folks in Bolivia and Cambodia and Namibia may even be unable to identify M. Sálih al-Mutlaq and M. Mahmúd Osmán, incredible though that may sound to you and me, Mr. Bones! Globalisation and MacLuhan's disease still have some distance to go as regards the ninenty-nine percent. However one may safely assume that all the OnePercenters proper have been networked by now.
At very least, there exist "main players" well outside "the region" whose zeal for Republican Party nonwithdrawal burns so brightly that it is no secret. Take Mr. Howard of Australia. Or closer to home (?) for M. Agha, Mr. Blair of Airstrip One. These two statespersons are not typical, of course, and perhaps we should remove them from our generalisations, not so much because they think in (almost) the very language of aggression and preëmptive retaliation, as because their own political fortunes have been handed over to Rancho Crawford as hostages.
The OnePercenters of Beijing and Lima, and most capitals in between, are not in that sad self-inflicted plight. They have very little to gain by advocating nonwithdrawal openly, a plan that would only produce unnecessary friction with their own respective 99 percents. At the same time, though, most global OnePercenters, and especially those outside "the region," will gain nothing worth mentioning should the GOP extremists, in the event, be pushed out of Mesopotamia lock, stock and barrel.
Dubyapologists have taken to preachin' a Party line that to "lose" "Iraq" would make Uncle Sam a laughing-stock, a pitiful helpless giant, and so on and so forth. Official Beijing and official Lima are not such fools as to suppose any such baloney, regardless of what their 99 percents may ignorantly or maliciously believe. Even at Paris, Schadenfreude is not uppermost in OnePercenterly thoughts. It may be entertaining to watch Greater Texas be taken down a peg or three, but entertainment is not to be confused with policy and realpolitisch interest. By and large, China and Peru are governed by competent OnePercenters highly unlikely to succumb to gland-basing and thrill-seeking in conjunction with a problem so remote as the bushogenic quagmire is to most of them. A GOP "defeat" in Peaceful Freedumbia would do nothing for or against them. A continuing -- and ideally, a perpetual -- GOP nonwithdrawal should commend itself to them on its own positive merits, not because of Ms. Chicken Little's silly scenarios, which at worst would affect only "the region."
What are these positive merits? Well, let's see:
(0) Mere legality ranks close to zero with Realpolitiker, yet for what it is worth, China and Peru, that is to say, the United Nations Security Council, has authorised the presence of militant palefaces from the US Republican Party inside the former Iraq. Sophists and calculators can thus maintain, even if only as a pretext, that to continue this arrangement is to uphold "international Rule of Law."
(1) Merit (0) has, or might have, a more positive aspect to it as well. If the Crawford cowpokers, or their successors in a putative Rodham-Clinton Administration, could be forced into a corner where they have to acknowledge that their whole occupation policy is legitimate only because the UNSC consents to it, that would be an excellent development from the point of view of global OnePercenterdom. In exchange for that concession, Beijing and Lima might even offer the Occupyin' Power a smidgen of serious and audible support for a change, because their domestic ninenty-nine percents could either be brought in general to see the advantages of such a deal, or at least divided and conquered with it. The local Doctors Goebbels could then proudly proclaim, "Behold how wonderful your government is, O Ruritanians! It has brought mighty America back within the law!" The Ruritanian OnePercenters themselves would not actually believe such foolery, to be sure, but that is scarcely the point. They get to pat themselves on the back, a positive benefit for them, clearly, and the invasionites get their nonwithdrawal, which they at least think is a benefit. A win-win situation -- for OnePercenters.
(2) Agitprop is not quite such a "soft power" as legalism is, but it remains pretty soft. But a silent winking and nodding at the Occupyin' Power in neo-Iraq has really hard-nosed advantages to offer as well. First and foremost is that as long as Crawfordites now, or Rodhamites to come, are bogged down in Peaceful Freedumbia, it becomes very difficult for them to invasionize any additional victims. Ruritanian and Paflagonian statespersons may very plausibly maintain that keeping the paleface invaders in the former "Iraq" is a major contribution to the national security of Ruritania and Paflagonia -- indeed, to the national security of pretty well everyplace that is not neo-Iraq (and perhaps the USA).
That last item being the crux of the matter, let us examine one primâ facie objection to it. Suppose the OnePercenters of Ruritania suddenly find themselves in desperate straits, facing some enemy domestic or foreign, "terrorists" or Paflagonians or whatever, and it would be convenient if they could borrow a bit of that Sole Remainin' Hyperpower for themselves? Wouldn't they then be very sorry that they had egged on the invasionites to nonwithdraw from neo-Iraq?
To which I respond, firstly, that such a dilemma would most likely befall statespersons "across the region," not outside it, so I shall let M. Agha handle that part of the question. My own preliminary intention is to expand his hypothesis to cover non-Semitic and non-Muslim OnePercenters.
As regards their strategy at the Casino of Human Events, to egg on GOP nonwithdrawal seems an excellent bet for them considered as a collectivity. Perhaps China or Peru or Paflagonia or Ruritania or Belize or Macedonia will in fact face such an unanticipated emergency, but the chances that any one of the punters in particular will do so is very slight, and the chance that all, or even a majority or significant plurality of them, will be suddenly in danger does not exist at all. Non-glandbased OnePercenters and Realpolitiker are not such children as to believe that any betting strategy whatsoever can be expected to work invariably. To be sure, Paflagonian statespersons would be buying the conceptual equivalent of life or fire insurance, a sort of "national security insurance," and so they will, if perfectly clear-headed, recognize that they are, as it were, "hoping" that the other guy dies first, or that his house becomes an arson victim rather than theirs. Yet since the other guys are all "hoping" exactly the same thing for Paflagonia, I fail to see that anybody has reason to complain. For most of the gamblers, this is once again a win-win proposition, and it might even be such for all of them, for after all, no crisis that demands assistance from Crawfordites or Rodhamites is predestined to occur to anybody at all outside The Region.
If worst comes to worst and Paflagonia, for example, loses the bet, her OnePercenter statespersons need not despair instantly. International gratitude does not count for much, but perhaps it might avail them a little to appeal to the Crawfordites/Rodhamites saying, "Don't you remember how we did as much as we dared to assist you in your nonwithdrawal from the former 'Iraq'? You guys really do owe us one." It might not work, but there would be no harm in trying it on. Whether or not they actually obtained any succour from Crawford (or Poughkeepsie) would presumably depend on the exact nature of their enemies and whether the invasionites happen to be afraid of those enemies as well. If the paleface invasionites were sufficiently terrorized in their own right, they could aid Paflagonia in distress with naval and air forces, since the high-tech whizbang side of hyperpower is not particularly bogged down in Peaceful Freedumbia. Only if Paflagonian OnePercenterdom required to have territory conquered back from their enemies and then given the Petraeus therapy would their case be utterly desperate, and that contingency is unlike to arise in this Brave New Epoch of ours in which the strictly defensive side appears to have immense and almost insuperable advantages over any assailant whose assault smacks of aggression. If the Lebanese God Party can defend itself brilliantly without even being a proper statelet, Paflagonia would have only herself to blame if such a scenario as we speculate about were ever enacted.
But now, enough of a priori generalisation, let us hear from M. H. Agha about "across the region":
| Overt political debate in the Middle East is hostile to the American occupation of Iraq and dominated by calls for it to end sooner rather than later. No less a figure than King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, arguably the United States' closest Arab ally, has declared the occupation of Iraq "illegal" and "illegitimate". Real intentions, however, are different. States and local political groups might not admit it - because of public opinion - but they do not want to see the back of the Americans. Not yet. For this there is a simple reason: while the US can no longer successfully manipulate regional actors to carry out its plans, regional actors have learned to use the US presence to promote their own objectives. Quietly and against the deeply held wishes of their populations, they have managed to keep the Americans engaged with the hope of some elusive victory. The so-called axis of moderate Arab states - comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan - dreads an early US withdrawal. First, because it would be widely interpreted as an American defeat, which would weaken these pro-American regimes while both energising and radicalising their populations. Second, if the US leaves, the emergence of a Shia regime in Iraq - in itself an offensive prospect to them - would only be a matter of time. Facing Arab antipathy, this regime would be likely to look eastward and forge close ties with its Iranian co-religionists. In the view of most Arabs, this would present a formidable challenge, setting in motion a series of dangerous events - an Iranian-Iraqi alliance; political and material support from Arab countries being offered to disgruntled Iraqi Sunni groups; retaliation by Iraqi forces; and the threat of broader regional involvement. Third, a US departure risks triggering Iraq's partition. As some Arabs see it, the occupation is what holds the country together. So long as coalition forces are deployed, a full-blown breakup can be avoided. In contrast, with the Americans gone, the odds of partition would increase dramatically, presenting a threat to the integrity and security of regional states. Exacerbating dormant, and in some cases not so dormant, secessionist tendencies would be one concern. Perhaps more worrying would be the ensuing challenge to the legitimacy of the fundamental tenets of nationhood, state, and national borders. |
Well, well! Of what sectarianism would you guess M. Husain Agha to be, Mr. Bones? He sure sounds like a Twelver to me. The only counterindications are faint indeed, namely that he does not count poor M. al-Málikí and the U.I.A. caucus as "the emergence of a Shia regime in Iraq," and that he evidently expects that when a product of that nature does arrive, it will be in thrall to the Qommies. Really and truly in thrall, not just supposed to be so by the Sunnintern and Ayatollah bin Ledeen.
| Paradoxically, the competing axis of so-called rogue states made up of Syria and Iran also wants the US to stay. So long as America remains mired in Iraq's quicksand, they think, it will be difficult for it to embark on a similar adventure nearby. This is true not only politically - the quagmire standing as a stark reminder of the invasion's failure - but also militarily: US capabilities will remain stretched for as long as the occupation continues. Moreover, American forces in Iraq present relatively soft targets for retaliation in case Iran or Syria is attacked. In short, whether or not Syria and Iran are correct in their calculations, the occupation of Iraq is seen as the most effective insurance policy against a possible US attack against them. |
The first paragraph of that is what we have attempted to expand so as to include China and Peru and Paflagonia and Ruritania. The other only applies to the immediate neighborhood. Nevertheless, an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of (non-preëmptive) retaliation, even for Damascus and Tehran.
| For Turkey, America's presence ensures that the national aspirations of Iraq's Kurds will not metamorphose into a fully fledged independent state, a strict red line for Ankara, which has its own irredentist Kurdish problem. By containing Kurdish ambitions, the US diminishes the probability of a costly and uncertain Turkish military campaign to thwart them. Nor is Turkey attracted to the prospect of an Iraqi Shia state allied to Iran and tolerant of Kurdish aspirations - an outcome it hopes the occupation will make less likely. For Israel too, an American withdrawal could spell disaster. Already, nothing has dented Israeli deterrence more than America's performance in Iraq - an inspiration to Israel's Arab foes that even the mightiest can be brought to heel. An early withdrawal, coming in the wake of last summer's Lebanon war, could put Israel in a dangerous position, handing a victory to Iran - the latest putative threat to Israel's existence - and providing a boost to Syria which may be considering military options to recover the Golan Heights. There are risks for the smaller Gulf states too. With their large Shia communities and heavy dependence on American protection, they would be threatened by an early US departure from Iraq. In Bahrain, home to an unhappy Shia majority, the fallout could be imminent. |
These are the obvious regional special cases. But where is Sa‘údiyya? Does M. Agha lump it together with the Gulfie dwarfs, or does he suppose it somehow above the fray, or what?
It is logical enough that if M. Agha makes Iran out a big winner, he needs to suggest that the Tel Aviv statelet is a big loser. He exaggerates in both directions.
| Inside Iraq, this is a period of consolidation for most political groups. They are building up their political and military capabilities, cultivating and forging alliances, clarifying political objectives and preparing for impending challenges. It is not the moment for all-out confrontation. No group has the confidence or capacity decisively to confront rivals within its own community or across communal lines. Equally, no party is genuinely interested in a serious process of national reconciliation when they feel they can improve their position later on. A continued American presence is consistent with both concerns - it can keep clashes manageable and be used to postpone the need for serious political engagement. Shias in government would like the US to stay long enough for them to tighten their grip on the levers of state power and build a loyal military. Those Shias who are not in power would like them to stay long enough to avoid a premature showdown with their rivals. Militant Shia groups can simultaneously blame the occupation forces for their community's plight and attack them to mobilise further support. Pro-Iranian Shias, meanwhile, retaliate against anti-Iranian US moves with attacks on Americans in Iraq. |
Golly, he sounds sort of like a cross between Dr. Reidar Visser and Neocomrade Gen. Caldwell!
| Al-Qaida and its affiliates arguably benefit most from the occupation. They established themselves, brought in recruits, sustained operations against the Americans and expanded. The last thing they want is for the Americans to leave and deny them targets and motivation for new members. Other Sunni armed groups need the Americans for similar reasons and for protection against Shias. For Sunni politicians, the occupation prevents a total Shia takeover of state institutions and helps increase their influence. |
Score no points for M. Agha for that paragraph. He does not see that his narration of facts amounts to the Arab Sunni mounting his camel and riding off in all directions, incidentally making it a joke to speak of "consolidation" quâ analyst. Tusk, tusk!
| Of all ethnic groups, the Kurds have made best use of the Americans. Protected by the US from their powerful and ruthless historical foes, Arab and Turk, they have built quasi-independent institutions and prospered amid relative security. They have no reason to want this situation to end. In common with neighbouring states, Iraqi Shias, Sunnis and Kurds are united in being able to use the Americans' presence to pursue separate and often conflicting political agendas. The grand disconnect in the region is between the political sentiments of ordinary people, which are overwhelmingly for an end to occupation, and the political calculations of leaders, which emphasise the benefits of using the Americans and consequently of extending their stay - at least for the time being. In this grim picture, the Americans appear the least sure and most confused. With unattainable objectives, wobbly plans, changing tactics, shifting alliances and ever-increasing casualties, it is not clear any longer what they want or how they are going to achieve it. By setting themselves up to be manipulated, they give credence to an old Arab saying: the magic has taken over the magician. |
The man's Crawfordology is at least as good as his colonial analyses, although it, too, is not faultless. Who can say with a straight face that the Boy-'n'-Party perps were ever clear about what they wanted or how to grab it? After 1 May 2003, anyway?
The overall theme of this pudding is not bad as far as it goes, but as with his treatment of the decomposition of the Sunni Ascendancy, M. Agha does not advance beyond description into explanation when he informs us that the Sunnintern tail has lately begun to wag the Crawfordite cur. So it has, but how and why?
Perhaps a B- would be fair, Mr. Bones?
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