VOI absurdly prints JT's manifesto as if it were the result of reporting, with "it added" and "it explained" and a dozen other variations stuck on at the end of each sentence. Here it is reconstituted and reassembled into paragraphs:
| Since he has come to office, President Talabani has been doing his best to reinforce the stable bases of national unity, relying on national consensus and respecting Iraq's main constituents and all other popular groups interested in establishing a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq. Regarding all complicated issues, Talabani has abided by the constitution and principles that strengthen national unity as an approach that guarantees the country's higher interests, without any bias, divisions, or anything that weakens trust and mutual work for the sake of narrow interests and alliances that evacuate the national consensus from its essence and aims. Talabani never relied on partisan or sectarian positions, and never hesitated to make his general political behavior in compliance with his national responsibility as a symbol of national unity to encounter scattering, domination, elimination, and using majority to exclude other constituents. Relying on national consensus and respecting major constitutents, as essential principles embraced by society to solve disputes and differences, has played a very effective role in the country's democratic political process. This process has been crowned with an environment of reconciliation that was mirrored in the past few days, when the Iraqi Accordance Front rejoined the cabinet in an attempt to reinforce the principle of national unity. Within this positive environment and mutual trust, a provincial election law was enacted in opposition to the will of the second largest Iraqi constituent, and contrary to the national consensus principle, relying on a very dangerous constitutional violation that could be negatively reflected on what has be achieved and what will be accomplished. The constitutional violation reaches many constitutional articles, but the most dangerous is the one that touches the constitution's soul and essence, represented by the consensus principle to solve all problems, disputes, and differences among blocs and major components. A secret vote on the item related to Kirkuk province is a heresy that may result in new political alignments that do not serve the aims and content of the democratic political process. Sides that adopted an unconstitutional practice to enact the provincial election bill in the Parliament missed that all this contradicts their claims about rejecting sectarianism and racial discrimination, not to mention the protection of national and political rights.... In its current form, which is approved by these sides, the law supports sectarianism and ethnic segregation, and enlarges the circle of extremism and isolation. President Talabani, who has been guided in his political approach by the consensus principle among the three constituents [*] and their interests that reflect higher national interests, has abided by the constitution and its soul, and cannot proceed with a law that violates all this. Talabani does not accept a law that has been passed by 127 lawmakers, less than 50 percent of the legislatores. He hopes that the Presidency Council would not pass it, relying on the only constant in the constitution and political process, represented by consensus as a base for mutual work in the new democratic Iraq. The president is looking forward that political leaderships and heads of parliamentary blocs will have a responsible stance to correct this constitutional and political malfunction that occurred due to narrow motivations, and to restore trust between the country's three constituents. The president's office believes that the insistence on violating consensus and encouraging unprincipled alliances will heavily damage the national unity and joint political work. |
[*] The one hint that VOI may not be entirely a mouthpiece for its Uncle Jalál is a gloss on "the three constituents" obtruded at this point. "(Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds)," decode the unjournalists. But pretty obviously JT himself codes it "(Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis)." Describing the quasiparliamentary background, JT speaks of "a provincial election law was enacted in opposition to the will of the second largest Iraqi constituent," which firmly establishes the Free Kurds in the second slot, constituentwise. And then "largest" means that the Twelvers must come first. Hence those poor, eternally put-upon TwentyPercenters bring up the rear.
Whether "largest" is strictly warrantable, who knows? Maybe the Free Kurds constitute twenty-one percent of the Mesopotamian subjects of AEI-GOP-DOD, with the brand-name TwentyPercenters really only nineteen percent. Maybe it is the other way around. For non-ex-Iraqis of any nationality other than the Free Kurdish, the order of precedence after Najaf's Number One is not a matter of concern. But naturally it is important for Uncle Jalál that his own theocommunitarian horse should place rather than show. And since he plainly proposes to set up as a mediator between those mobs of squabbling bedouin, perhaps it is fitting that the Free Kurds should fall between the two stools numerically.
In any case, the crux of Uncle Jalál’s Political Cabin is not which inhabitant of it is most obese, but rather that there are only and exactly three (3.00) inhabitants, a triunity of ‘constituents’ as he ventriloquizes VOI.
Thee should stop and think about that constitutent census for a couple of seconds, Mr. Bones, and not let it slip by unnoticed because thee have heard it a thousand and one times before. Observe that Uncle Jalál not only believes, but believes aggressively and proäctively, in what goofball gentry like Miss Lynx and Dr. Cartoonoclastes keep thundering against as ‘sectarianism.’ Observe further that it has never crossed the goofballs’ minds that M. Jalál Tálebání has any particular connection with wicked ‘sectarianism.’ They have to blame somebody for introducing this apple of discord into the Ba‘thí Garden of Eden, naturally, but they would much rather blame Senator Biden rather than Free Kurds. Until quite recently, the conspiratorializers seemed scarcely aware that Free Kurds so much as exist. That has begun to change as the question of who is to have Kirkúk warms up. The rigorously nondenominational Sunní-lovers are quite sure that the TwentyPercenters must have it. As you can see from his manifesto, that is not Uncle Jalál’s view of the case. It certainly looks as if those two narrow trains of thought are going to collide head on, and probably sooner rather than later. The gentry at Mu’ámara Junction see a large number of invisible specters, yet they did not see this crash coming. Neither did their factionette's favourite guru, Dr. Righteous Virtue. [1]
In any case, Uncle Jalál really believes what a large number of innocent victims are mistakenly accused of believing, that the first and really crucial thing to know about the former Iraq is that it is omnis divisa in partes tres. Where did he learn that lesson? Thee would think, from the elaborate fandango that he dances at VOI, that he gets it out of the Khalílzád Konstitution. But that is ridiculous, because theocommunitarian triunity is not in the Khalílzád Konstitution. Mr. Feldman of Harvard and Khalílzád Pasha of AEI-GOP certainly had no intention of imposing the effective konstitution that Uncle Jalál wants to head-of-state it under, the konstitution that features "soul and essence, represented by the consensus principle to solve all problems, disputes, and differences among blocs and major components." There is a vast deal too much "soul and essence" in the Feldmano-Khalílzádí document for my own taste, yet not a tenth as much as Uncle Jalál would like to squeeze out of it. Noah and Zalmáy did not thumb their noses at Mr. Madison and the Gang of ’87 to the extent of sticking any Principle of Consensus™ into their light-hearted neocolonial spoof. If M. de Tálebání wants a Principle of Consensus™ -- and obviously he does -- let him frankly supply one of his own, not saddling anybody else with responsibility for it.
Though basically a travesty of Mr. Madison, the Khalílzád Konstitution is not absolutely antimadisonian. Amidst all the pious wishes and edifyin’ declamations from the invasionites and their collaborators, amidst all those blanks to be filled in later, there are a few scraps of the KhK with enforcement mechanism attached. With or without Soul and Essence and Principle of Consensus™, then, it appears that Uncle Jalál can veto a bill if he happens not to like it. Let him do so, say I, and let him keep his mouth shut about why he has decided to holler ¡Nie pozwalam! next time he hollers.
This time around, the WHY is so blatant as to be positively obscene, even without solemn insincerities about "the law supports sectarianism and ethnic segregation, and enlarges the circle of extremism and isolation." If he can’t just shut up, though, M. de Tálebání might consider being frank: "I have decided to veto this legislation because it infringes the freedom of Free Kúrdestán" should do the trick. It is true, of course, that from seventy-nine (79) to eight-one (81) percent of Coalition subjects in the former Iraq do not give a significant hoot about the freedom of Free Kúrdestán. That is why silence beats frankness. But frankness would do Uncle Jalál no additional damage, I think. He would not make any new enemies by saying out loud what everybody knows he thinks. [2]
[1] Dr. Virtue's most recent revelation, dated 22 June 2008, reads as if he still can’t see it coming. The Virtutite account of the quasiparliamentary background is at least as eccentric as the Tálebánian,
| In many ways, the current version of the law for the provincial elections serves to underline the growing confidence of a group of centralist Shiite politicians around Nuri al-Maliki. It challenges the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) with the ban on the use of religious places of worship in elections campaign, while at the same time does not give the Kurds everything they want regarding Kirkuk – Kurdish representatives ultimately abstained from the final vote, where some 127 out of 140 members of parliament reportedly supported the law. Interestingly, complaints about the voting procedure for the law itself prompted criticism from Kurds and UIA independent Khalid al-Atiyya alike, suggesting that the presidential veto may once more come into play in Iraqi politics in relation to this piece of legislation. |
(Who could guess from that that Uncle Jalál thinks he is presiding over a Konstitutional Krisis?)
[2] An objector might object that M. de Tálebání ought to supply a Khalílzád-Konstitutional sort of WHY in conjunction with rejecting a bill presented to him by the quasideputies. Indeed, but the freedom of Free Kúrdestán comes much closer to being konstitutional than does any tripe and baloney about triune consensus. The not-so-great charter that Master Noah conceived and Sultán Zalmáy graciously vouchsafed does not go as far towards the absolute independence of Free Kúrdestán as Uncle Jalál and most of his hillbilly nephews and nieces desire, but it goes a pretty far piece towards it. And that in word and not Soul and Essence alone!
By contrast, the foundational document for post-Iraq says simply nothing at all about reviving the spirit of ancient Polish konstytucjionalizm. And, as a matter of fact, Noah and Zalmáy and their local native friends were not deliberately aimin’ to refurbish the zlota wolnosc of yore, even though nobody knowledgable would guess anything different from examining what they produced.
Aggression-based konstitutionalizers just happen to be extremely bad marksmen, don't you know? They aimed at makin’ quite sure that none of their neosubjects can tyrannize over the rest, but what they actually hit was Old Poland. It could happen to anybody -- and that is another excellent reason why nobody ought to dabble in invasionism.
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