| It is not difficult for any analyst to find out how the U.S. tried to ally itself with almost all Iraqi factions with their different hues in the past five years. The alliance with these parties has usually come as they were seen by the U.S. to be at the apex of their power. The ultimate aim has been to appease almost everybody as a means to extricate itself from the Iraqi debacle. |
Ah, that fatal "almost all"! If only thug Party had called to Party thugs at the very outset of the five year period, paleface Bushevik geopols makin' a deal with native Ba‘thí operatives, none of this unfortunate misunderstandin' of a Peaceful Freedumbia would have been necessary. As any analyst can plainly see, should she care to look back that far. Why, in November 2002, even a GOP genius might have detected which faction to negotiate with and extend Kirkpatrician patronage and apologetics to -- the "apex of power" was quite unmistakable.
If "our" Boy and Party did not understand exactly what held His Excellency S. Hussein up there on top of the heap, what would it have mattered? Do the Busheviki know with any accuracy why their Gen. Mubárak does not get toppled from his pyramid, after all? Or indeed, their dynasty petrobuddies at al-Riyád? Do Big Management Party geopols need to know such things about the managers of their local franchises in the Greater Levant?[1] In the unlikely event that one of their bastards gets toppled by his own subjects, there will almost certainly be another bastard waiting for his Kirkpatrick Authoritarian Certificate™ within twenty-four or forty-eight hours. The apex of collaborationism may be temporarily vacant, but it is still there, and much the quickest way to re-establish blessed stability, keepin' gas cheap and Tel Aviv fans quiet, is to recognize and uphold whichever indig gets there firstest with the mostest -- this, also, without impertinently inquiring into exactly what is goin' on that Col. Yuck should now replace Generalissimo Ick. Big Management can usually take it for granted that Generalissimo Yuck, as he now becomes, will be able to maintain himself at the top of the greasy pole. To ask lots of rude questions about so very minor an episode of régime change as Yuck replacin' Ick in Outer Fasádistán would be geostrategically pointless. Party neocomrade Ambassador J. Kirkpatrick might even interpolate from the grave that such an inquistion is quite inconsistent with the well-known fact that Outer Fasádistán is quite as sovereign and independent and constitutional as China or Peru or Wyomin', though admittedly O.F. may a bit less technically democratic than certain other little foreign friends of Boy and Party that might be mentioned.[1]
However the present slave of al-Bazzáz, a certain M. Fátih ‘Abd as-Salám, does not avail himself of the full five years, and starts analyzing only after the aggression of March 2003. That plan leaves the aggression itself hors d'analyse, which is an arrangement more likely to suit a neo-Iraqi subject or exile than those of us who watch events from within the holy Homeland. I quite see that the victims of militant GOP invasionism had their whole mental worlds turned upside down by the advent of vigilante cowpokers, yet if they are to venture upon serious analysis, they ought to be able to appreciate that it was nowhere near so traumatic a deal for Uncle Sam as for the former Iraq. (11 September 2001 was nowhere near so traumatic either, though that is rather another story.)
In any case, M. ‘Abd as-Salám in effect proposes to explain everything after the aggression without explaining the aggression itself, which seems a dubious methodology from any point of view that comes to mind. Naturally his proposed Key to all Mythologies -- "The ultimate aim has been to appease almost everybody as a means to extricate itself from the Iraqi debacle" -- makes no sense whatsoever if retrojected before the actual assault. Houdini might tie himself in knots to have the fun of escaping from them, but Harvard Victory School bigmanagers, however klutzy and narcissistic, are not at all likely to behave like prestidigitators, stagin' debacles for the sheer fun of extricatin' themselves from the rubble by appeasin' everybody all 'round.[2]
How does one go about self-extrication via omnidirectional appeasement, then? Like this, it appears:
| Initially, the U.S. implicated itself in the woes of the ethnic and sectarian strife in Iraq by siding and backing one particular group against the other. This policy continued while at least one important part of the country was burning. And not long ago, it realized it had to extend a helping hand to opposite groups, too. So it is clear now that the U.S. is not sympathetic to one sect only. It wants to have a foot in the disparate worlds of Iraq’s uncompromising sectarian, tribal and political factions. Even the groups resisting U.S. presence in the country have come to realize that almost everyone in Iraq now relies on U.S. assistance to maintain its share of power and influence. |
If you ignore all context, Mr. Bones, you might suppose that M. ‘Abd as-Salám agrees with Party neocomrade E. Luttwak that the stumblebums of Crawford have somehow fallen into a brilliant triumph of statesmanship by sheer accident. "Almost [every faction] in Iraq now relies on U.S. assistance to maintain its share of power and influence" -- does that not sound like, for example, what Cardinal Richelieu more or less achieved in his German policy? Perhaps the extremist Busheviki should not be awarded any points for it, considering that they never deliberately aimed at anythin' of the sort, but still, if they had aimed, would this alleged coup not be worthy of many, many points?
But once we bring in some context, we are obliged to wonder what colour the sky looks to M. ‘Abd as-Salám, for of course there remain a number of factions and factionoids and factionettes in the former Iraq that do not "rely" on the militant GOP for anything more than target practice. I suppose if the TwentyPercenter shootists had no paleface Party operatives to shoot at, their "share of power and influence" would shrink still farther -- if that's possible -- but in any case, M. ‘Abd as-Salám describes the current correlation of forces in an exceedingly peculiar way. What next?
| Therefore, Iraqi resistance has wisely chosen to ignore the Iraqi government and any other group whose existence depends on America.[3] If they want to talk, these groups say, they will only talk to the U.S. This shows that both friend and foe in Iraq see the U.S. as the common denominator. Without U.S. occupation troops, the government cannot survive.[4] The tribes now need U.S. support to maintain the surge in their standing, influence and power. Resistance groups need to talk to the U.S. and explore a diplomatic and political avenue to achieve their target of driving its occupation troops [away] without shedding more blood. |
When the likes of Bazzáz go soft and squishy and sentimental about the effusion of blood, it is difficult not to speculate that maybe they think they are losing. So perhaps M. ‘Abd as-Salám remains on speaking terms with the former Real World to some extent after all? However, he will have to address himself to it a bit more frankly than this, admitting in particular that noneffusion of blood is not quite the TwentyPercenters' whole "target," any more than it is the whole target of militant Republican Party extremism either. "Let's be serious, please, O gentlethugs! A deal between two such parties as you would be esthetically and ethically appropriate, and it may even be attainable, but only if you'll both cut out all the silly bullshit first."
M. ‘Abd as-Salám declines to talk turkey, however, and refuses to spell out exactly what the Big Party invasionites would get in return for undoin' most of what they have mischieved in the former Iraq and restorin' some facsimile of the former Sunní Ascendancy. On the contrary, he only subsides into softer and deeper bullshit:
| This shows that the only option the parties in Iraq have including the resistance is talking to Washington on how to end its occupation and at the same time making utmost benefit from the massive capabilities of the world’s most powerful economic power to reconstruct their war-torn country. In other words, they will need to persuade the U.S. to turn its formidable occupation army into an investment to rebuild their imploded state. America has destroyed the foundations of Iraq and it is under moral obligation to have them rebuilt. |
Who down at the ranch gives a hoot about "their war-torn country" or "their imploded state"? Except insofar as these very peripheral things might cast luster or the reverse upon Boy and Party, or threaten cheap gas, or alarm the fans of Tel Aviv? M. ‘Abd as-Salám, like most political thugs, seems not altogether lacking in nous, so presumably he knows that it is really pretty absurd to pester the Big Party invasionites about "moral obligation," quite as absurd as for them to pester him or the late Saddám with such manifest claptrap.
On the other hand, our self-proclaimed analyst may simply be so unaware of the quirks and quiddities of local colour here in the holy Homeland that he genuinely thinks he can make an impression on the cowpokers of Rancho Crawford and Castle Cheney simply by waving the word "investment" at them. Morality, whether considered as claptrap or more warmly, tends to be universal, whereas the salient peculiarities of our Harvard Victory School MBA classes are provincial and parochial and not to be predicted by outsiders a priori. M. ‘Abd as-Salám requires to know what the Party perps themselves look for in an "investment." It appears from this scribble that he does not know, and further, that he has not the faintest clue that his knowledge might be deficient.
Still, in theory it is possible that this twistifier considers himself to be only opening negotiations with the militant Crawfordites and therefore under no obligation to reveal how much he understands of their weird manners and mores. On balance this possibility seems to me unlikely, however, because M. ‘Abd as-Salám deploys both "appease" and "investment" in ways that he ought to have avoided if he really grasped how the Big Managerial mindset is likely to react. On top of which, and even worse than verbal infelicity, is the latent implication throughout that all the cowpoker vigilantes want at this point in their aggression against the former Iraq is to be shown the egress.
That is about as wrong as wrong can be, I'd say. But God knows best.
____
[1] As regards scientific interrogation and so-called "rendition," it seems positively an advantage for Boy and Party not to know for sure exactly what their native collaborationists are up to. Bushevik operatives testify much more plausibly under oath to their ignorance when they really are ignorant. Sort of.
As regards the general political structure of the Greater Levant, this is no doubt a minor point, but it is worth reminding the Busheviki of it from time to time, because I suspect it goes against the Big Managerial grain to allow their "allies" even that small space for autonomy. Nevertheless, it would be counterproductive for the Harvard Victory School MBA's to place so many surveillance cameras in Outer Fasádistán that they cannot but know for sure about t*rt*r* and all that. By Big Party lights, management has a right to assure themselves that their little foreign friends are not in violation of the contract with Rancho Crawford, and especially that the LFF are not secretly scheming to replace Generalissimo Ick with some intolerable troublemaker like Dr. Mosaddeq or Col. Nasser. However they do not need to know exactly what is happenin' in every last official cellar and dungeon of Outer Fasádistán in order to be reasonably secure against that major sort of violation. This is fortunate for the whole Greater Levantine racket, as presently carried on, since our HVS MBA classes are not in fact very good at installin' and maintainin' figurative surveillance cameras in Party protectorates so remote linguistically and culturally as Egypt or Sa‘údiyya or Outer Fasádistán.
[2] Sad to say, the way M. ‘Abd as-Salám brandishes the word "appease" raises instant doubts in advance that his Crawfordology can really be half as good as he accounts it. "Appease" is almost exactly contrary to the natural downhill flow of the HVS MBA mindset, unless it is diluted almost out of existence, as it would be, for instance, should anybody claim that the executives of ordinary private-sectorian corporations engage in continual "appeasement" of their customers and their employees and their nominal owners and directors. It would be intelligible to talk that way, no doubt, yet anybody who possessed a proper grasp of Big Managerialism and then went on to talk so would clearly be trying to annoy in addition to -- or instead of -- trying to analyze.
When "appeasement" is really the mot juste, with no sarcasm anywhere in sight, the object of appeasement is at least half outside the sphere of Big Management to begin with. Considering Bazzázístán and the TwentyPercenterdom of the former Iraq as a potential object of Big Party "appeasement," M. ‘Abd as-Salám probably means the word ingenuously, but when he suggests that heretics and hillbillies have been, or are to be, "appeased" also, a gap begins to open up between word and thing.
[3] Presumably the TwentyPercenter shootists do not, in fact, ignore themselves, as would logically be entailed by M. ‘Abd as-Salám's Blakean generalization.
[4] The slave of Bazzáz might actually get us forwarder a little if he discussed whether any neorégime at New Baghdád could survive without money, and probably bodies, from Crawford. Could a strict TwentyPercenter neorégime manage it at this point? Could even the late Saddám have pulled that trick off, once all the infrastructure that held up the Ba‘thí "apex" had been dismantled and discarded?
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